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PRESENTING A CLAIM UNDER THE FEDERAL
TORT CLAIMS ACT
Donald N. Zillman*
The passage of the Federal Tort Claims Act in 1946 by the United
States Congress was a landmark in the development of government
tort law. The Act waived the sovereign immunity of the United States
and allowed suit against the United States for the tortious actions
of its officers and employees.' Since its passage, the Act has largely
fulfilled its dual objectives of providing justice to parties injured by
government wrongdoing and freeing Congress from the burden of con-
sidering individual requests for waivers of sovereign immunity through
the mechanism of the private bill.2
Few pieces of legislation are so clear as to remove all doubt as
to their meaning. The Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) is no excep-
tion. The Act is not precise in defining those government employees
who can subject the United States to liability,3 and it does not spell
out whether the government can be held liable under a theory of strict
liability.4 Although a perplexing series of Supreme Court and lower
court cases have created and refined the law of the government-
employee plaintiff,5 the Act itself makes no mention of the eligibility
of injured government employees as claimants against the government.
Further, the Act's exceptions to liability are imprecise. The refusal
to waive immunity for government "discretionary functions" continues
to be litigated after three decades of judicial decisions.6
In these areas, Congress and the courts face difficult policy choices,
for in passing the FTCA Congress did not intend that every injury
that could be remotely tied to United States governmental activity
would authorize recovery of damages. Indeed, Congress also desired
to protect certain government decisions from being second-guessed
through tort litigation. In any case, as the policies underlying the
FTCA often conflict, litigation or legislative correction becomes
necessary.
Copyright 1983, by the author and LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
* Professor of Law, University of Utah.
1. 28 U.S.C. SS 2671-2680 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
2. 1 L. JAYSON, HANDLING FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS § 52, 58, 65.01 (1982).
3. See United States v. Orleans, 425 U.S. 807 (1976); Logue v. United States, 412
U.S. 521 (1973).
4. See Laird v. Nelms, 406 U.S. 797 (1972).
5. See Stencel Aero Eng'g v. United States, 431 U.S. 666 (1977); United States
v. Brown, 348 U.S. 110 (1954); Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950); Brooks v.
United States, 337 U.S. 49 (1949). See generally Zillman, Intramilitary Tort Law: In-
cidence to Service Meets Constitutional Tort, 60 N.C.L. REV. 489 (1982).
6. 28 U.S.C. S 2680(a) (1976). See Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15 (1953);
Zillman, The Changing Meanings of Discretion: Evolution in the Federal Tort Claims
Act, 76 MIL. L. REV. 1 (1977).
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One of the most litigated aspects of the Federal Tort Claims Act
involves little policy content. There are over 250 cases' considering
the statutory and administrative procedures required for placing the
merits of a claim before the proper federal administrative agency or
court. In many of these cases, the claims-presentation requirements
prevented the claimant from getting a hearing on the merits of his
claim, because the Act's statute of limitations puts the claimant at
risk of losing his chance to recover for government wrongdoing.
The rationale of the FTCA is that the party harmed by the alleged
wrongdoing of the United States should have a hearing and deter-
mination on the merits of his claim. The volume of reported cases
on both the claims-presentation and statute-of-limitations requirements
suggests a failing somewhere in the system. Has Congress created
a statutory obstacle course? Have the administrative agencies or the
courts read complexity into the Act beyond that intended by Con-
gress? Are claimants and their attorneys to blame?
This study of the presentation requirements8 will attempt to clarify
the existing state of the law and suggest necessary changes in the
law. The author proceeds from the belief that both the claimants and
the United States have an interest in seeing that a claim under the
FTCA is properly presented for an expeditious decision on its merits.
Any case which must be taken to the federal courts to determine
whether the presentation requirements have been satisfied is a loss
for all parties concerned-the claimant, his attorney, government
counsel, the judiciary, and the public interest. Clearly, the claimant
bears the burden of making a proper presentation of his claim.
However, the government attorney also should be aware of the claims-
presentation requirements. The government attorney can prevent the
well-meaning claimant, particularly the one not represented by an
attorney, from presenting a claim in an improper fashion. In addition
to advancing the congressional objective of fair consideration of claims
on their merits, a word of advice at the proper time can save govern-
ment officials from later having to spend time and money litigating
presentation issues.
The claimant's attorney may face a presentation issue in several
7. The author examined all reported cases since the passage of the 1966 legisla-
tion implementing the present administrative procedures of the FTCA. Cases included
those in 367 F.2d through 685 F.2d (1966-1982) and 267 F. Supp. through 544 F. Supp.
(1966-1982). One case was found in the Federal Rules Decisions and one in the Supreme
Court Reporter. A total of 267 cases were discovered.
8. The phrase "presentation requirements" includes both the filing of a claim
with the federal administrative agency charged with the negligent or wrongful act
and the subsequent filing of a complaint in federal district court if administrative resolu-
tion of the claim is unsuccessful.
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contexts. Ideally, the attorney has been retained immediately after
occurrence of the tortious government conduct. Here the attorney's
task is to know the presentation law and to comply with it in a way
that causes no delay or disqualification of the client's claim. A less
fortunate situation occurs when the attorney is first retained by the
claimant at a time when errors in the presentation of the claim have
already been made and the statute of limitations threatens to forever
bar the claim. Here the attorney faces the unenviable double burden
of finding a way to correct the prior presentation errors and, if suc-
cessful, winning the case on the merits. A third burden that this at-
torney may have to face is the unpleasant issue of a prior attorney's
malpractice in the unsatisfactory presentation of the claim.
The most unusual situation arises when the claimant or attorney
consciously chooses to challenge some aspect of the presentation re-
quirements. The claimant may feel a particular provision is unconstitu-
tional or contrary to statute or regulation. The attorney also may feel
that compliance with the requirement would harm the claimant's case
(e.g., by disclosing more information to the government than is
desirable or by delaying eventual resolution of the matter). In such
cases the attorney must assess the risk of disqualifying the claim if
the court does not agree with the challenge to the presentation
requirements.
This article begins by examining the development of the FTCA
claims-presentation requirements. The second section then discusses
the method of compliance with these requirements. The sections follow-
ing examine the failures in presentation practice, cases that at best
forced the claimant to prove to a court that the presentation require-
ments had been satisfied and at worst have seen a possibly meritorious
FTCA action dismissed with prejudice for failure to comply with the
presentation requirements. The cases are divided into those examin-
ing the requirement of an administrative presentation of the claim
(a statutory requirement of the FTCA since 1966) and those examin-
ing the requirements for the filing of a complaint in federal district
court. Among the matters litigated have been the documentation re-
quired in the claim, the statement of a sum certain of damages, the
claim brought on behalf of others, the accrual date of the claim, the
amendment or reconsideration of a claim, and the administrative denial
of a claim. The cases help to define the defect-free presentation pro-
cedure. They also suggest areas where amendment of the regulations
or statute might improve FTCA practice.
DEVELOPMENT OF THE PRESENTATION REQUIREMENT
In 1946, suits against governments in tort were the exception
rather than the rule in the United States. While some tort claims
1983]
LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
were allowed at the federal, state, and local levels, it was hard to
predict the consequences of subjecting the federal government to a
general tort liability.' Accordingly, Congress acted with considerable
restraint. While the Federal Tort Claims Act called for the use of
state law to resolve many substantive issues," all cases under the
FTCA were to be tried in federal district court by a judge alone."
The government could compromise or settle a claim with court
approval "after institution of any suit."'2 Prior to filing suit, however,
settlement possibilities were limited. The original FTCA authorized
an administrative agency head or his designee to settle "any claim
against the United States for money only," up to $1,000.13 Once the
administrative claim was filed with the wrongdoing agency, the claim-
ant could not bring suit unless the agency made "final disposition"
of the claim or the claimant, "upon 15 days notice given in writing,
withdrew the claim."' 4 The suit could not ask for more damages than
that presented in the administrative claim unless new evidence of in-
creased damages was shown."
The presentation requirements of the 1946 Act were given teeth
by the statute of limitations contained in section 420.1" That section
distinguished between the administrative claim for under $1,000
presented to an agency and the claim brought directly by lawsuit.
The claim taken directly to court had to be brought within one year
"after such claim accrued." The claim for $1,000 or less that the claim-
ant chose to first present to an administrative agency had to be
presented within one year of accrual "in writing to the Federal agency
out of whose activities it" arose. If no administrative settlement was
reached, the claimant was given an extension on the statute of limita-
tions "for a period of six months from the date of mailing of notice
to the claimant by such federal agency as to the final disposition of
the claim or from the date of withdrawal of the claim ... if [the statute
of limitations] would otherwise expire before the end of such period."'7
The 1946 version of the FTCA reflected the movement from
legislative (private bill) to judicial settlement of tort claims against
9. 1 L. JAYSON, supra note 2, at S 55, reviews. the tort remedies against the
United States existing in 1946.
10. 28 U.S.C. SS 1346(b), 2672 (1976).
11. Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, ch. 753, Pub. L. No. 79-601, S 410(a),
60 Stat. 812, 843-44 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. S 2402 (1976)).
12. Pub. L. No. 79-601, S 413, 60 Stat. 812, 845.
13. Pub. L. No. 79-601, S 403, 60 Stat. 812, 843.
14. Pub. L. No. 79-601, S 410(b), 60 Stat. 812, 844.
15. Id.
16. Pub. L. No. 79-601, S 420, 60 Stat. 812, 845 (1946).
17. Id.
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the United States. Administrative settlement was recognized but given
only a narrow scope. Even in 1946, the $1,000 limit on administrative
claims promised to send only some property damage and minor per-
sonal injury claims to the administrative process. Furthermore, the
administrative process was voluntary for the claimant-he could still
take the $50 tort claim directly to federal district court. Statutory
amendments in 1959 and 1966 marked the growth of the administrative
tort settlement process.18 The legislative history of both acts suggested
the virtues of the administrative process. 9 In the first place, it could
remove work from the increasingly overburdened federal courts; the
tort claim settled administratively would not occupy precious judicial
time. Second, the administrative process, when handled properly,
offered prompt and relatively uncomplicated settlement of claims. As
the larger federal agencies, (e.g., the post office and the branches of
the armed services) developed claims expertise, they became better
able than the federal courts to do justice to injured persons.
In 1959, the administrative claims limit was raised from $1,000
to $2,500.20 The Senate Report on the legislation (which urged increas-
ing the limit to $3,000) noted that a higher administrative claims limit
would have allowed the settlement of many cases then pending in
the courts.2 Unfortunately, the amendment still left a majority of
claims outside the administrative process. The Senate Report discussed
a 1958-1959 study that showed that three-quarters of all Federal Tort
Claims Act suits were brought for over $5,000." Further, ad-
ministrative presentation remained optional with the claimant; the
government could not compel a claimant to first pursue an ad-
ministrative remedy.
By 1966, Congress had become convinced of the virtues of the
administrative process. In effect, Congress reversed the presumption
of the 1946 Act that tort claims were to be settled by court action
subject to a limited administrative procedure. As a result, subsequent
to the effective date of the 1966 amendment, "[a]n action shall not
be instituted upon a claim' . unless the claimant shall have first
presented the claim to the appropriate federal agency and his claim
shall have been finally denied by the agency in writing and sent by
18. Pub. L. No. 86-238, 73 Stat. 471 (1959); Pub. L. No. 89-506, 80 Stat. 306 (1966).
19. S. REP. No. 797, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1959 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 2272; S. REP. No. 1327, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1966 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 2515.
20. Pub. L. No. 86-238, S 2, 73 Stat. 471, 472 (1959).
21. S. REP. No. 797, supra note 19, reprinted in 1959 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
2272, 2273.
22. Id.
19831
LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
certified or registered mail."23 The failure of the agency to make "final
disposition of a claim within six months after it is filed shall" at the
claimant's option "be deemed a final denial.""4 An exception to the
administrative presentation requirement was created for claims
"asserted under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure by third party
complaint, cross claim or counterclaim. 2 5
A separate provision of the amendment authorizes the "head of
each Federal agency . . ., in accordance with regulations prescribed
by the Attorney General," to consider and settle any claim. Justice
Department control is maintained by requiring "the prior written
approval of the Attorney General or his designee" for any award in
excess of $25,000.6 The fifteen day withdrawal period for an adminis-
trative claim created by the 1946 Act was repealed.' The statute of
limitations was amended to bar a claim "unless it is presented in
writing to the appropriate Federal agency within two years after such
claim accrues or unless action is begun within six months after the
date of mailing, by certified or registered mail of notice of final
denial."28 The legislative history of the 1966 amendment noted the
dual objectives to "ease court congestion" and "expedite the fair set-
tlement of tort claims. 29 Justice Department officials had pointed out
that most FTCA cases were settled prior to trial. Since the agencies
had developed expertise in tort procedures and had the best access
to information about the tortious incident (their personnel were the
alleged wrongdoers), they were to be given a reasonable opportunity
to effect a settlement before the matter reached the Justice Depart-
ment and the courts. Worries over possible irresponsible handling of
federal monies were reduced by requiring the Attorney General's of-
fice to prescribe settlement regulations and to approve settlements
over $25,000. °
The 1966 amendments changed the role of the claimant and the
administrative agency. Prior to the amendments, the claimant could
ignore the agency. Even if the claimant wished to deal with the
agency, only claims of small value could be considered. All other claims
23. Pub. L. No. 89-506, S 2(a), 80 Stat. 306, 306 (1966) (now codified at 28 U.S.C.
S 2675(a) (1976)).
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Pub. L. No. 89-506, S 1(a), 80 Stat. 306, 306 (1966) (now codified at 28 U.S.C.
S 2672 (1976)).
27. Pub. L. No. 89-506, S 3, 80 Stat. 306, 307 (now codified at 28 U.S.C. S 2677 (1976)).
28. Pub. L. No. 89-506, S 7, 80 Stat. 306, 307 (1966) (codified at 28 U.S.C. S 2401(b)
(1976 & Supp. 11 1978)).
29. S. REP. No. 1327, supra note 19, reprinted in 1966 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 2515, 2516.
30. 28 U.S.C. S 2672 (1976).
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were presented by filing suit in federal court. Now, as a result of
the 1966 amendments, a claimant must deal with the administrative
agency regardless of the amount of the claim or the claimant's
preference for beginning in federal court. Congress was convinced that
the administrative process worked and insisted that even those claim-
ants hostile to the agency that had wronged them had to deal for
a time with that agency. Fifteen years and hundreds of presentation
cases later, it is accurate to say that a major reason claimants and
their attorneys encounter procedural difficulties under the FTCA is
their failure to appreciate that Congress was serious in requiring an
honest effort to reach administrative settlement of FTCA claims.
PROPER PRESENTATION OF THE CLAIM
In all too many cases something has gone wrong in the claims
filing process. Before examining the failures, however, it is helpful
to examine how claims should be filed. While there are unusual
features in the FTCA claims-presentation statutes and regulations,
they should pose no significant problem to the attorney or the in-
telligent lay person proceeding without legal representation. 1
The claimant unfamiliar with Federal Tort Claims Act practice
should remember two essential facts. First, as mentioned, Congress,
the administrative agencies, and the courts are serious about the ad-
ministrative settlement of tort claims. The claimant who regards the
administrative exhaustion process as an unfortunate impediment to
the real business of bringing suit in federal district court will be prone
to make errors in the presentation of the claim. Second, the claimant
is well advised to forget all he has ever learned in other contexts
about filing claims and statutes of limitation. The Federal Tort Claims
Act procedures are different from private party tort litigation and
actions against other government entity defendants. The claimant
should not assume that state law rules or statutory provisions will
carry over into FTCA practice.
An attorney who has been asked to represent a claimant with
an apparently meritorious claim against the United States under the
Federal Tort Claims Act should first consider whether he faces an
immediate problem with the statute of limitations. If more than two
years have passed since the "accrual" of the claim against the United
States, it will be necessary to determine whether the claim is barred
by the passage of time. Research should begin with the FTCA itself.
31. Prior authors reach the same conclusion. See Silverman, The Is and Outs of
Filing a Claim Under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 45 J. AIR L. & COMM. 41, 60 (1979);
see generally Pitard, Procedural Aspects of the Federal Tort Claims Act, 21 Loy. L. REV.
899, 909 (1975).
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The Act is relatively brief and deserves a reading in its entirety.2
Particular attention should be paid to the administrative claims33 and
statute of limitations" sections. Section 2672 authorizes "regulations
prescribed by the Attorney General" for the settlement of claims by
a federal agency.35 The regulations provide considerably more detail
about the filing of claims than do the statutory sections. The Justice
Department regulations authorize other federal agencies "to issue
regulations and establish procedures"3 on their own, and most federal
agencies have adopted specific regulations regarding the handling of
claims. 7 The combination of the agency and the Justice Department
regulations gives detailed guidance for the filing of the claim. After
digesting the claims filing procedure, the attorney is well advised to
phone or write the agency general counsel or the regional counsel's
office. The call will allow the attorney to verify that the claim is
directed to the proper agency and to double check the filing procedure
with the agency expert. It will also allow the attorney to discover
any new regulations and to learn matters of agency practice and pro-
cedure not discussed in the regulations. The attorney should pay at-
tention to questions of settlement authority. The attorney may
discover that a $4,000 claim can be settled promptly at an agency's
local or regional headquarters, while a $6,000 claim may require several
additional layers of review. The safest way to file a claim with any
agency is to follow all instructions when completing United States
Government Standard Form 95 (SF95). While the Attorney General's
regulations do not require the use of SF95, 8 all agencies are familiar
with it. Use of SF95 calls attention to the fact that an FTCA claim
is being filed. In addition, compliance with the instructions on SF95
will insure that the essential elements of the claim have been
presented. In many contested FTCA cases where an SF95 was
presented, government claims officers called attention to deficiencies
in the original form of the claim, thus giving the claimant a second
opportunity to present a satisfactory claim. 9
Section 14.2(a) of the Attorney General's regulations identifies the
essential elements of the claim. The claim is deemed presented when
"a Federal agency receives from a claimant, his duly authorized agent
or legal representative, an executed Standard Form 95 or other writ-
32. 28 U.S.C. SS 1346(b), 2401, 2671-2680 (1976).
33. Id. §S 2672, 2675.
34. Id. S 2401(b).
35. The regulations are in 28 C.F.R. S 14 (1982).
36. Id. S 14.11.
37. 1 L. JAYSON, supra note 2, at A-89-105 apps. 38-40.
38. 28 C.F.R. S 14.2(a).
39. Id. S 14.2(a).
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ten notification of an incident, accompanied by a claim for money
damages in a sum certain." Dispute has arisen over the required
documentation that must be presented with a claim. The Federal Tort
Claims Act itself does not specify documentation. The Attorney
General's regulations, specific agency regulations, and SF95 do insist
on supporting evidence. While some courts have supported the claim-
ant's position that he need not disclose everything requested by the
government in order to satisfy the claims-presentation requirement,
some documentation must be required if the administrative presenta-
tion requirement is to have any meaning." Counsel should offer at
least basic documentation supporting the elements of the client's claim.
Satisfactory submission of an SF95 or its equivalent within two years
of the accrual of the claim will satisfy the administrative presenta-
tion requirement41 and the first portion of the FTCA statute of
limitations.42 Responsibility for proceeding then rests with the govern-
ment agency. Ideally, the government will promptly assess the claim
and make some response to the claimant's attorney. The intent of the
statute is to require an assessment and negotiating period of at least
six months after the filing of the claim and to encourage the continu-
ance of negotiations as long as they are agreeable to both parties.
To this end, the FTCA provides two very different six-month re-
quirements. Section 2675(a) states:
An action [in court] shall not be instituted upon a claim ... unless
the claimant shall have first presented the claim to the ap-
propriate Federal agency and his claim shall have been finally
denied by the agency in writing and sent by certified or registered
mail. The failure of an agency to make final disposition of a claim
within six months after it is filed shall, at the option of the claim-
ant any time thereafter, be deemed a final denial ....
This provision requires the claimant to give the government six
months to make an administrative determination of the claim, while
the second sentence provides the claimant with protection against
agency delay. If the six-month period passes without a final denial
of the claim, the claimant may elect to end the administrative pro-
cess and file suit in federal district court. The claimant is not required
to do so, however. Often administrative negotiations will continue for
several years after the filing of the claim, with both claimant and
government claims officer feeling that they are working towards an
eventual settlement.
A second six-month requirement is triggered by the agency's final
40. See text at notes 81-88, infra.
41. 28 U.S.C. S 2675(a).
42. 28 U.S.C. S 2401(b).
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denial of a claim. The second portion of the FTCA statute of limita-
tions bars a claim from court "unless action is begun within six months
after the date of mailing .. .of notice of final denial."43 The most
obvious final denial is the government's refusal to recognize any lia-
bility on the claim. The legislative history of the 1966 amendment
to the statute of limitations noted that a final denial may also include
"instances where partial approval of a claim results in an offer un-
acceptable to the claimant and rejected by him."" The latter situa-
tion could cause difficulty for the claimant, as he may be uncertain
as to whether his response to the partial settlement offer by the
government agency has set the statute of limitations running. For-
tunately, the Attorney General's regulations require the final denial
to include a statement that the claimant must bring suit within six
months.45 Until this sentence appears in a certified or registered letter
from the agency, the claimant may feel comfortable that no statutory
"final denial" of his claim has taken place. By contrast, when "final
denial" or "last offer" language does appear, coupled with the six-
month notice, the claimant had better prepare to enter the judicial
arena. The judicial action must be brought in federal district court
in the district in which the plaintiff resides or in which the negligent
or wrongful act occurred.46 The claimant should remember that the
six-month statute of limitation runs from "the date of mailing" rather
than the date of receipt of the notice of final denial.47
LITIGATING PRESENTATION ISSUES: PRESENTING THE CLAIM TO THE
ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY
The preceding summary of "defect-free" claims presentation under
the FTCA sets the stage for discussion of the cases in which some
aspect of the presentation requirement has had to be litigated. As
mentioned, the attorney involved in such a case should hope that he
is attempting to straighten out the errors of the claimant or a previous
attorney. If the attorney himself has made the error, he will be at-
tempting to avoid a subsequent malpractice suit. Dozens of cases have
made it clear that the administrative presentation of a claim is a
jurisdictional requirement under the Federal Tort Claims Act. 8 A
federal court will dismiss an FTCA suit when it discovers that ad-
43. Id.
44. S. REP. No. 1327, .supra note 19, reprinted in 1966 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 2515, 2518.
45. 28 C.F.R. 14.9(a).
46. 28 U.S.C. 1402(b) (1976).
47. 28 U.S.C. 2401(b).
48. See, e.g., Bailey v. United States, 642 F.2d 344 (9th Cir. 1981). 1 L. JAYSON,
supra note 2, S 315, at 17-10 n.ll, compiles the cases.
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ministrative requirements have not been satisfied. The easy cases are
the ones in which the plaintiff offers no evidence of any kind of ad-
ministrative presentation. Often, these cases involve multiple causes
of action against the United States and its employees. Even though
jurisdiction may be satisfied for other theories of action, the FTCA
claims will be dismissed for lack of administrative presentation.49
What: The Contents of the Claim
A number of litigated cases have involved attempts by claimants
to resist dismissal by proving that they did present an administrative
claim. Most of these cases suggest that the plaintiff actually was not
intending compliance with the FTCA administrative presentation re-
quirement at the time the alleged "administrative presentation" was
made. Rather, the cases suggest that the plaintiff discovered the
jurisdictional requirement of an administrative claim only after filing
suit and was attempting to discover some previous action that would
qualify as a presentation of an administrative claim. Courts generally
have been unsympathetic to these creative presentation efforts. The
language of the statute of limitations requiring presentation "in writing
to the appropriate Federal agency"5 has proved fatal to a number
of plaintiffs. Oral presentations of claims in the form of requests to
the wrongdoer for restitution51 or requests for a meeting with the
United States Attorney have been rejected as qualified presentations
of administrative claims."2 A number of written presentations of claims
have been disallowed because they were not addressed to a federal
agency; examples include state court proceedings,53 worker's compen-
sation proceedings under a state statute,54 state agency implementa-
49. See, e.g., Brady v. Smith, 656 F.2d 466 (9th Cir. 1981); Contemporary Mission,
Inc. v. United States Postal Serv., 648 F.2d 97 (2d Cir. 1981); Leonhard v. United States,
633 F.2d 599 (2d Cir. 1980); Bruce v. United States, 621 F.2d 914 (8th Cir. 1980); Szyka
v. United States Secretary of Defense, 525 F.2d 62 (2d Cir. 1975).
50. 28 U.S.C. S 2401(b). 28 U.S.C. S 2675, headed "Disposition by federal agency
as prerequisite; evidence" requires that the "claimant shall have first presented the
claim to the appropriate Federal agency," without mention that it be in writing.
However, 28 U.S.C. § 2672 ("Administrative adjustment of claims") authorizes ad-
ministrative consideration of claims "in accordance with regulations prescribed by the
Attorney General." The regulations in 28 C.F.R. S 14.2(a) require use of SF95 or "other
written notification."
51. Best Bearings Co. v. United States, 463 F.2d 1177 (7th Cir. 1972) (alleged FBI
conversion of property); Shubert Constr. Co. v. Seminole Tribal Hous. Auth., 490
F. Supp. 1008 (S.D. Fla. 1980).
52. Grasso v. United States Postal Serv., 438 F. Supp. 1231 (D. Conn. 1977); Turtzo
v. United States, 347 F. Supp. 336 (E.D. Pa. 1972); see also Lehner v. United States,
685 F.2d 1187 (9th Cir. 1982).
53. Gush v. Bunker, 344 F. Supp. 247 (W.D. Tenn. 1972).
54. Mendiola v. United States, 401 F.2d 695 (5th Cir. 1968).
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tion of a federal project,55 notice to insurance companies, 56 and notice
under a state landlord-tenant law.5" Dealings with federal agencies have
been held insufficient where they have either merely inquired about
the availability of rights or benefits without actually presenting a
claim58 or requested a different form of statutory benefit.59 A second
category of cases involve the failure to supply a "sum certain" in the
claim. Unlike the previous nonpresentation cases, the "sum certain"
litigation typically involves a claimant who has alerted the federal
agency in writing of an intent to seek FTCA recovery. The "sum cer-
tain" requirement appears nowhere in the Federal Tort Claims Act-it
instead is found in the Attorney General's regulations." Despite harsh
results, federal courts have treated the "sum certain" requirement
as an essential element of the administrative claim. Indeed, some
courts have argued that the "sum certain" requirement is inherent
in the meaning of the word "claim."61 Other courts, however, have
looked to provisions of the FTCA to indicate the necessity of a precise
dollar figure in the claimant's presentation to the administrative
agency. 2 The first such provision looked to by the courts is the clause
in section 2672 requiring any award in excess of $25,000 to be ap-
proved by the Attorney General or his designee. The second such
provision is that which forbids the commencement of a suit for more
55. Hejl v. United States, 449 F.2d 124 (5th Cir. 1971) (Texas state agency im-
plementing United States Public Health Service spraying program).
56. Caton v. United States, 495 F.2d 635 (9th Cir. 1974); see also Driggers v. United
States, 309 F. Supp 1377 (D.S.C. 1970).
57. Three-M Enters. v. United States, 548 F.2d 293 (10th Cir. 1977).
58. Smith v. United States, 588 F.2d 1209 (8th Cir. 1978); Hau v. United States,
575 F.2d 1000 (1st Cir. 1978); College v. United States, 572 F.2d 453 (4th Cir. 1978);
Benitez v. Presbiterian Hosp., 539 F. Supp. 470 (D.P.R. 1982); DiLorenzo v. United
States, 496 F. Supp. 79 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Mayo v. United States, 425 F. Supp. 119 (E.D.
Ill. 1976); Franklin State Bank v. United States, 423 F. Supp. 1 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); San-
tiago Rivera v. United States of N. Am., 405 F. Supp. 330 (D.P.R. 1975); Mims v. United
States, 349 F. Supp. 839 (W.D. Va. 1972).
59. Vanderberg v. Carter, 523 F. Supp. 279 (N.D. Ga. 1981) (military CHAMPUS
benefits); Gordon H. Ball, Inc. v. United States, 461 F. Supp. 311 (D. Nev. 1978) (Teton
Dam Disaster Assistance Act); Dancy v. United States, 668 F.2d 1224 (Ct. Cl. 1982)
(claim to Merit Systems Protection Board).
60. 28 C.F.R. S 14.2(a) provides:
For purposes of the provisions of 28 U.S.C. 2401(b) and 2672, a claim shall be
deemed to have been presented when a Federal agency receives from a claimant,
his duly authorized agent or legal representative, an executed Standard Form
95 or other written notification of an incident, accompanied by a claim for money
damages in a sum certain for injury to or loss ' of property, personal injury, or
death alleged to have occurred by reason of the incident.
61. Avril v. United States, 461 F.2d 1090, 1091 (9th Cir. 1972) (unless "it is a claim
for something, [it] is nolt] [a] claim at all").
62. Caton v. United States, 495 F.2d 635 (9th Cir. 1974); Ianni v. United States,
457 F.2d 804 (6th Cir. 1972); Bialowas v. United States, 443 F.2d 1047 (3d Cir. 1971).
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than the amount of the administrative claim in the absence of new
facts.63
As a matter of legal logic, the courts' rulings are defensible. The
government claims officer does have his job made more difficult by
the claimant's failure to place a precise dollar amount on the damage
request. In theory, the requirement forces the claimant to make a
reasoned estimate of the harm done to .him by the government. It
also provides the government officer with information about his set-
tlement authority. 4 In fact, however, the logic of the "sum certain"
requirement provides significant inducement for considerably inflated
damage claims. The regulations and cases tell the claimant that he
must put some dollar figures in the blanks on the SF95; they also
suggest that it can be awkward to correct an underestimation. The
FTCA requires the claimant to present "newly discovered evidence
not reasonably discoverable at the time of presenting the claim to
the federal agency, or . . .intervening facts, relating to the amount
of the claim" in order to increase the damages requested in court
over the damages asked in the administrative complaint.6 5 Therefore,
why not just list the two broken bones and contusions as worth
$100,000 and start the bargaining'from there? If the legislative in-
tent is to deal fairly, but not lavishly, with injured claimants, the pre-
sent process disserves this purpose. The "sum certain" requirement
is most clearly satisfied by placing' an exact dollar figure in each of
the damage categories on SF95 or mentioning a precise amount in
any other written claim. Statements that the exact amounts are
unknown have caused claims to be rejected for lack of a sum certain;
such cases have included notations of "Unknown at this time, 66 "neck,
chest and right arm,"6 "on treatment,"6 and "Pending No Fault
Benefits."" Cases also have rejected as uncertain the enclosure of some
bills or statements of expenses with imprecise claims."0 Some courts
have rejected dollar figures where they are qualified. Thus a claim
for "in excess of $50,000.00" failed to meet the "sum certain"
63. 28 U.S.C S 2675(b).
64. In addition to the statutory requirement that awards of over $25,000 receive
the approval of the Attorney General's office, individual agencies may grant settle-
ment authority to different offices within the agency, dependent on the amount re-
quested by the claimant.
65. 28 U.S.C. S 2675(b).
66. Caton v. United States, 495 F.2d 635 (9th Cir. 1974).
67. Bialowas v. United States, 443 F.2d 1047 (3d Cir. 1971).
68. DeGerena v. United States, 398 F. Supp. 93 (D.P.R. 1975).
69. Cooper v. United States, 498 F. Supp. 116 (W.D.N.Y. 1980).
70. Bailey v. United States, 642 F.2d 344 (9th Cir. 1981); Schaefer v. Hills, 416
F. Supp. 428 (S.D. Ohio 1976); Jordan v. United States, 333 F. Supp. 987 (E.D. Pa.),
aff'd, 474 F.2d 1340 (3d Cir. 1971).
19831
LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
requirement,7 as did a claim for $2,135.45 plus personal injury." Other
decisions have been more sympathetic to the claimant who has made
some effort to identify the amount of damages. Qualified claims of
"Approximately $15,000.00,"" "$149.42 presently," 4 and "approximate
$100,000.00 ' I and a qualified reference to a $560 claim"6 have been
allowed by treating the qualifying language as surplusage. Other courts
have allowed the "sum certain" requirement to be met by bills or
repair costs or other statements of value mentioned in supporting
documents.77 Further cases have excused clerical errors on the part
of the plaintiff under circumstances where the government should have
been aware of the actual sum requested."
The apparent harshness of the cases rejecting claims for lack of
a sum certain is mitigated by the fact that government claims officers
have often attempted to point out a claimant's errors in time to cor-
rect a deficiency." While government claims officers are not required
to point out claimants' errors," their conduct does make rare the case
in which the government knowingly allows the statute of limitations
to run on a technically deficient complaint. Nevertheless, several of
the sum certain cases decided against the claimant appear unjust.
Claimants have asked for redress and provided sufficient information
for the government to begin an assessment of their case. The fact
that the dollar amount of damages is left open reflects honest uncer-
tainty rather than an attempt to evade government investigation. The
government is not in a substantially better position when they are
given an obviously inflated "sum certain" than if the item is left blank
at the time of filing a claim. Government investigation can proceed
71. Raymond v. United States, 445 F. Supp. 740 (E.D. Mich. 1978).
72. Robinson v. United States Navy, 342 F. Supp. 381 (E.D. Pa. 1972); see also
Allen v. United States, 517 F.2d 1328 (6th Cir. 1975); Williams v. United States, 541
F. Supp. 1242 (W.D. La. 1982).
73. Fallon v. United States, 405 F. Supp. 1320 (D. Mont. 1976); see also Apollo
v. United States, 451 F. Supp. 137 (M.D. Pa. 1978).
74. Erxleben v. United States, 668 F.2d 268 (7th Cir. 1981).
75. Walley v. United States, 366 F. Supp. 268 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
76. Industrial Indem. Co. v. United States, 504 F. Supp. 394 (E.D. Cal. 1980).
77. Crow v. United States, 631 F.2d 28 (5th Cir. 1980); Molinar v. United States,
515 F.2d 246 (5th Cir. 1975); Lester v. United States, 487 F. Supp. 1033 (N.D. Tex.
1980); Boyd v. United States, 482 F. Supp. 1126 (W.D. Pa. 1980); Mack v. United States
Postal Serv., 414 F. Supp. 504 (E.D. Mich. 1976).
78. Little v. United States, 317 F. Supp. 8 (E.D. Pa. 1970); Rabovsky v. United
States, 265 F. Supp. 587 (D. Conn. 1967).
79. Shelton v. United States, 615 F.2d 713 (6th Cir. 1980); Melo v. United States,
505 F.2d 1026 (8th Cir. 1974); Bialowas v. United States, 443 F.2d 1047 (3d Cir. 1971);
Reilly v. Peterson, 435 F. Supp. 862 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Miller v. United States, 418 F.
Supp. 373 (D. Minn. 1976); Robinson v. United States, 342 F. Supp. 381 (E.D. Pa. 1972);
Muldez v. United States, 326 F. Supp. 692 (E.D. Va. 1971).
80. Muldez v. United States, 362 F. Supp. 692 (E.D. Va. 1971).
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in either case. At some point, the claimant must offer an exact dollar
figure, but it is doubtful whether the failure to do so at the time
of filing the claim should result in the heavy penalty of an expired
statute of limitations.
A separate section of the Attorney General's regulations provides
that the claimant "may be required to submit the following evidence
or information" with the claim." The regulation and the instructions
on Standard Form 95 elaborate on the type of information required.
Several cases have addressed the question of whether failure to com-
ply with documentation requirements can cause an otherwise valid
claim to be treated as a nullity. Two courts of appeals cases suggest
opposing positions. In Swift v. United States,82 the claimant's other-
wise satisfactory SF95 did not offer documentation to support the per-
sonal injury claim. The government requested documentation several
times without results. Nearly two years later the claimant filed suit.
The court held that the suit was premature since the personal injury
claim, although expressed in a sum certain, had not met the documen-
tation requirement. The court did not address the fact that the statute
of limitations had run on the plaintiffs claim if the undocumented claim
was treated as not properly presented.
In sharp contrast, in Adams v. United States,' the claimant's at-
torney refused to comply with the government's request for medical
bills and other evidence. The court supported the plaintiff's position
that the notice required under section 2675 did not mandate a full
disclosure of the plaintiffs case to the government. The court ana-
logized the statutory notice required in section 2675 to that required
in tort actions against municipalities. The requirement was designed
to alert the government to a claim against it, not to specify all details
of settlement negotiations. The court observed that the Attorney
General's regulation on claims presentation, 28 C.F.R. § 14.2(a), re-
ferred to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2401(b) and 2671, not section 2675. The court
found that the claimant had offered sufficient evidence to allow the
government to proceed with its investigation. On reconsideration, the
court sustained its decision but avoided deciding the effect of a claim-
ant's refusal of an agency's "reasonable request for supplemental in-
formation to clarify an inadequate claim. 84
Several recent cases have adopted the Adams position." In Douglas
81. 28 C.F.R. S 14.4(a)-(c).
82. 614 F.2d 812 (1st Cir. 1980).
83. 615 F.2d 284 (5th Cir.), per curiam clarification & reh'g denied, 622 F.2d 197
(5th Cir. 1980).
84. 622 F.2d at 197.
85. Avery v. United States, 680 F.2d 608 (9th Cir. 1982); Tucker v. United States
Postal Serv., 676 F.2d 954 (3d Cir. 1982); Douglas v. United States, 658 F.2d 445 (6th
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v. United States,86 the claimant failed to provide medical reports and
insurance information required by the regulations. The court sided
with the claimant when it was satisfied that the claimant was not
trying to "evade" the administrative process.87 District court decisions
prior to Adams had generally taken a hard line on documentation.8
Recent cases, however, have favored the claimant in documentation
disputes. The Adams-Douglas compromise appears to be a sensible
one. The government is entitled to ask for enough supporting documen-
tation to allow an investigation to proceed. To allow less would
preclude the meaningful attempt to achieve administrative settlement
mandated by Congress in the 1966 FTCA amendments. Ideally, the
claimant and the government will agree to a policy of mutual full
disclosure of information. However, the government should not be able
to threaten a claimant with the total invalidation of his claim for the
failure to comply with its every discovery request. Such a dispute
may destroy the possibility of an administrative settlement, but it
should leave the claimant free to seek further relief in federal court.
Who: Persons Eligible to Present the Claim
Considerable confusion has surrounded the issue of who may pre-
sent an administrative claim under the Federal Tort Claims Act. The
statute itself is of little help. Section 2675 requires presentation by
"the claimant." The Attorney General's regulations are more elaborate.
The claim for property damage or personal injury may be presented
by the victim or a "duly authorized agent or legal representative."8
A claim for wrongful death shall be presented by the "executor or
administrator" or by such other person authorized by state law. A
claim from the agent or legal representative shall "be accompanied
by evidence of his authority to present a claim on behalf of the
claimant."'" Finally, a lawfully subrogated insurer may present a
claim.8 2 Litigation has arisen over these provisions of the Attorney
Cir. 1981); Reynoso v. United States, 537 F. Supp. 978 (N.D. Cal. 1982); Hoaglan v.
United States, 510 F. Supp. 1058 (N.D. Iowa 1981). See also Gross v. United States,
676 F.2d 295 (8th Cir. 1982).
86. 658 F.2d 445 (6th Cir. 1981).
87. The claimant did supply some medical and employment information to the
government.
88. Manis v. United States, 467 F. Supp. 828 (E.D. Tenn. 1979); State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co. v. United States, 446 F. Supp. 191 (C.D. Cal. 1978); Rothman v. United
States, 434 F. Supp. 13 (C.D. Cal. 1977); Kornbluth v. Savannah, 398 F. Supp. 1266
(E.D.N.Y. 1975); Robinson v. United States Navy, 342 F. Supp. 381 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
89. 28 C.F.R. S 14.3(a) & (b).
90. Id. S 14.3(c).
91. Id. 5 14.3(e).
92. Id. 5 14.3(d).
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General's regulations. The message for the attorney from these cases
is to examine all possible causes of action by all possible claimants
and make sure that an administrative claim is presented to cover each
cause of action by a party eligible to make the presentation. While
some courts have been willing to waive "technical defects," others
have not. In the latter situation, the claim itself often has failed
because the statute of limitations on the administrative presentation
had run before a proper person presented the claim.
The cautious attorney beginning an FTCA case should secure a
properly executed power of attorney from the client or clients. The
power of attorney should authorize him to take all necessary adminis-
trative and judicial actions under the Federal Tort Claims Act and
other provisions of law in regard to a described incident. The power
of attorney should accompany the completed Standard Form 95 to
the agency. In the alternative, the attorney should secure the claim-
ant's signature on the Standard Form 95 to satisfy the presentation
requirement. Depending on the claims officer, however, the attorney
later may need to submit the power of attorney before beginning
negotiations over the claim. Despite the language of the regulations,93
many government claims officers will assume that the attorney has
authority to act for the claimant. Several court decisions have waived
the necessity of a formal statement of authority." However, the occa-
sional decisions that insist on proof of authority suggest that full com-
pliance is the prudent path for the attorney. 5
Four categories of claims have raised problems concerning eligi-
bility to present a claim for other parties. These are insurance claims,
spousal claims, children's claims, and class claims. Judicial decisions
concerning these claims have been inconsistent.
In 1949, the Supreme Court recognized that the United States
could be liable for a subrogated claim under the Federal Tort Claims
Act. The current Attorney General's regulations spell out the pro-
cedure for the insurance company claim.97 A claim wholly paid by a
93. "A claim presented by an agent or legal representative shall . . . be accom-
panied by evidence of his authority to present a claim on behalf of the claimant as
agent, executor, administrator, parent, guardian, or other representative." 28 C.F.R.
S 14.3(e).
94. Forest v. United States, 539 F. Supp. 171 (D. Mont. 1982); Foskey v. United
States, 490 F. Supp. 1047 (D.R.I. 1980); Hunter v. United States, 417 F. Supp. 272
(N.D. Cal. 1976) (overruled in House v. Mine Safety Appliances Co., 573 F.2d 609, 618
(9th Cir. 1978)).
95. House v. Mine Safety Appliances Co., 573 F.2d 609 (9th Cir. 1978); Triplett
v. United States, 501 F. Supp. 118 (D. Nev. 1980).
96. United States v. Aetna Sur. Co., 338 U.S. 366 (1949).
97. 28 C.F.R. S 14.3(d).
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subrogated insurer "may be presented" by the insurer. A partially
subrogated claim "may be presented by the parties individually as
their respective interests appear, or jointly.""0 The litigated cases have
arisen in partial subrogation situations. The court decisions have
recognized that two claims exist against the United States and that
each claimant (insurance company and insured) should perfect its own
claim. A strict reading of the federal "real party in interest" rule for-
bids either insurer or insured from bringing suit for the entire amount
of the damages.9 Where either insurer or insured presents only its
own claim for damages, the other claimant may not be able to treat
that filing as satisfying its presentation of a claim.' Courts. have
recognized claims, however, where one party presents the total claim
with some mention of the other party's interest.' The government
agency will probably prefer to consider all claims arising out of one
incident at one time. One claimant, probably the insurance company,
should work with the other to coordinate the filing of the separate
claims.
The most litigated issue in the spousal area has involved claims
for loss of consortium by the spouse of the physically injured claim-
ant. Frequently, the administrative claim has been filed by or on behalf
of the physically injured party without mentioning a spousal claim
for loss of consortium.' 2 In other cases, the injured party has asserted
the consortium loss as part of the overall claim.' 3 In both situations,
the courts have held that the consortium claim has not been properly
presented.
In still other cases, courts have forgiven technical errors and
allowed one spouse to present the claim for the other. In Locke v.
United States,'4 a husband was allowed to present a claim for his own
damages personally, his wife's damages as his wife's executor, and
his children's damages as next friend of his children. The court found
that Standard Form 95 was unclear on the presentation requirement
and the government was fairly placed on notice as to the nature of
the family's claim. The court in Estate of Santos v. United States 5
98. Id.
99. FED. R. Civ. P. 17(a). See Wadsworth v. United States Postal Serv., 511 F.2d
64 (7th Cir. 1975).
100. Shelton v. United States, 615 F.2d 713 (6th Cir. 1980).
101. Interboro Mut. Indem. Ins. Co. v. United States, 431 F. Supp. 1243 (E.D.N.Y.
1977); Sky Harbor Air Serv., Inc. v. United States, 348 F. Supp. 594 (D. Neb. 1972).
102. Johnson v. United States, 496 F. Supp. 597 (D. Mont. 1980); Stephan v. United
States, 490 F. Supp. 323 (W.D. Mich. 1980); Stewart v. United States, 458 F. Supp.
871 (S.D. Ohio 1978); Ryan v. United States, 457 F. Supp. 400 (W.D. Pa. 1978); Collazo
v. United States, 372 F. Supp. 61 (D.P.R. 1973).
103. Walker v. United States, 471 F. Supp. 38 (M.D. Fla. 1978); Santoni v. United
States, 450 F. Supp. 608 (D. Md. 1978).
104. 351 F. Supp. 185 (D. Hawaii 1972).
105. 525 F. Supp. 982 (D.P.R. 1981).
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allowed a claim to be filed under the name of the deceased where
an accompanying letter made it clear that his widow was the claim-
ant. In Campbell v. United States,'" a husband was allowed to present
a claim for his incapacitated wife as an "other representative," even
though he had not been made guardian ad litem at the time of suit.
The ability of parents to file claims for their children also has caused
difficulty. The courts have consistently treated the adult child as no
different from an unrelated claimant. The adult child must either
perfect his own claim or the parent must show specific authority to
act for him.1"7 Greater flexibility has been shown in the case of the
minor child. In House v. Mine Safety Appliances Co.,"° the court
cautioned that a parent has no inherent authority to file on behalf
of his child, but the parent did have "inherent authority" to repre-
sent his minor children in a joint claim. Other cases have stretched
the presentation regulations to preserve a claim for the living minor
claimant. °9 A claim for a deceased child in Pringle v. United States. °
received a less generous interpretation. The court did not assume that
the parents had qualified automatically as executor for their child's
estate, and it dismissed their complaint. Where a conservator prop-
erly filed a claim for a child, the court, in Green v. United States,"'
held that the mother would have to file a separate claim for the
expenses she had paid. Her failure to do so resulted in dismissal of
her claim.
In general, the cases suggest the need for close attention to state
laws governing rights of representation." 2 While courts are reluctant
to deny a claim that will benefit a child, the regulations and judicial
opinions governing claims by persons other than the injured party
encourage careful attention to the correct assertion of the right to
represent a child.
A 1978 study of class actions concluded that the Attorney
General's regulations set an "unnecessary and often insurmountable
barrier" to use of the class action device under the FTCA."3 Judicial
106. 534 F. Supp. 762 (D. Hawaii 1982).
107. House v. Mine Safety Appliances Co., 573 F.2d 609 (9th Cir. 1978); Estate of
Santos v. United States, 525 F. Supp. 982 (D.P.R. 1981).
108. 573 F.2d 609 (9th Cir. 1978).
109. Locke v. United States, 351 F. Supp. 185 (D. Hawaii 1972). See also Forest
v. United States, 539 F. Supp. 171 (D. Mont. 1982).
110. 419 F. Supp. 289 (D.S.C. 1976). But see Van Fossen v. United States, 430 F.
Supp. 1017 (N.D. Cal. 1977).
111. 385 F. Supp. 641 (S.D. Cal. 1974).
112. Pringle v. United States, 419 F. Supp. 289 (D.S.C. 1976); see also Rothman v.
United States, 434 F. Supp. 13 (C.D. Cal. 1977) (sisters ineligible to bring claim).
113. Note, Administrative Exhaustion Under the Federal Tort Claims Act: The Im-
pact on Class Actions, 58 B.U.L. REV. 627, 628 (1978).
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decisions have taken the position that while a class action is possible, 4
it must meet the administrative presentation requirement that "each
claimant . ..submit an independent and separate claim.""' This in-
volves individual authorization of a claim and the specification of a
sum certain. The latter requirement is not satisfied by a single damage
figure."6 Lunsford v. United States"' suggests that if claim authoriza-
tion and a sum certain can be perfected for all claimants, a class may
be certified. The facts of the FTCA class action cases reveal the fre-
quent improbability of this approach. Among failed class action claims
have been ones for all parties damaged by major flooding in the state
of Pennsylvania," 8 parties damaged by a forest fire,"9 parties damaged
by flooding caused by government cloud seeding,2 ' parties incon-
venienced by government failure to police air travel charters, 2 ' and
persons damaged by government use of the chemical Agent Orange
in Vietnam. 22 One of the air charter cases alleged 40,000 claimants. 22
The Agent Orange case alleged 2,400,000 claimants.
The reluctance to recognize an FTCA class action is consistent
with statutory limitations on recovery2 and the Supreme Court deci-
sion in Dalehite v. United States."5 In Dalehite, the Supreme Court
used a questionable interpretation of the "discretionary function"
exemption to pass back to Congress the determination of United States
responsibility for the series of explosions that destroyed much of Texas
City, Texas. Congress did create an administrative board to evaluate
and pay claims from the Texas City disaster."' In mass disaster situa-
tions, Congress may deem it appropriate to examine the liability issue
and make a judgment of its impact on individual claimants and the
114. Lunsford v. United States, 570 F.2d 221 (8th Cir. 1977); Pennsylvania v. Na-
tional Ass'n of Flood Insurers, 520 F.2d 11 (3d Cir. 1975); Founding Church of Scien-
tology of Wash., D.C., Inc. v. Director, FBI, 459 F. Supp. 748 (D.D.C. 1978).
115. Pennsylvania v. National Ass'n of Flood Insurers, 520 F.2d 11, 23 (3d Cir. 1975).
116. Caidin v. United States, 564 F.2d 284 (9th Cir. 1977); Kantor v. Kahn, 463
F. Supp. 1160 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
117. 570 F.2d 221 (8th Cir. 1977).
118. Pennsylvania v. National Ass'n of Flood Insurers, 520 F.2d 11 (3d Cir. 1975).
119. Blain v. United States, 552 F.2d 289 (9th Cir. 1977).
120. Lunsford v. United States, 570 F.2d 221 (8th Cir. 1977).
121. Luria v. Civil Aeronautics Board, 473 F. Supp. 242 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Kantor
v. Kahn, 463 F. Supp. 1160 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
122. In re Agent Orange Product Liability Litigation, 506 F. Supp. 757 (E.D.N.Y.
1980).
123. Kantor v. Kahn, 463 F. Supp. 1160 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
124. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. S 2678 (limits on attorney's fees in FTCA actions); S 2674
(prohibition of punitive damages and prejudgment interest in FTCA actions); S 2402
(prohibition of jury trials in FTCA actions).
125. 346 U.S. 15 (1953).
126. Act of Aug. 12, 1955 (Texas City Disaster Act), ch. 864, Pub. L. No. 378, 69
Stat. 707.
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general public interest. The FTCA recognizes one category of
claimants who need not present an administrative claim. The statute's
requirement of administrative presentation does not apply to "claims
as may be asserted under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure by
third party complaint, cross-claim, or counterclaim.""12 The logic of this
provision is to excuse the administrative exhaustion requirement for
the claimant who is pulled into litigation against his wishes. The cases
have provided a narrow reading of the exemption. In every relevant
reported case the government has been successful in its assertion that
the claimant did not qualify for the exemption and first had to pur-
sue his administrative remedies. Two different situations have been
considered. In the first, the claimant initially has brought suit against
a party other than the United States. When that defendant has at-
tempted to add the United States to the litigation, the claimant (the
original plaintiff) has asserted a complaint against the United States.
The courts generally have denied the plaintiff's request to excuse the
presentation of an administrative claim through application of the
counterclaim, cross-claim, or third party claim exemption. Since the
plaintiff began the entire litigation, the courts have felt that he did
not fit within the exception to the administrative claim requirement."8
The second type of case has involved the noncompulsory
counterclaim. Here the government first brought suit against the
claimant. The claimant's response has included a noncompulsory
counterclaim. Despite a statutory lack of distinction between types
of counterclaims in section 2675, courts have required claimants to
pursue their administrative remedy on the noncompulsory counterclaim
before being allowed to bring suit. Again, the courts focus on whether
the claim was forced upon the claimant. 29
These cases provide one of the strongest judicial affirmations of
the administrative presentation requirement. The statute itself does
not make the distinctions that the courts make. The results of the
cases (regularly favoring the government's view of the litigation)
should make attorneys cautious about relying on the exception under
circumstances where there is still time to present administrative
claims. Why should the claimant risk the court's disagreement with
his assessment that he really has a compulsory rather than a per-
127. 28 U.S.C. S 2675(a).
128. West v. United States, 592 F.2d 487 (8th Cir. 1979); Rosario v. American Export-
Isbrandtsen Lines, Inc., 531 F.2d 1227 (3d Cir. 1976) (claim was not a third party com-
plaint; plaintiff was not forced to bring suit against the United States).
129. Northridge Bank v. Community Eye Care Center, Inc., 655 F.2d 832 (7th Cir.
1981); United States v. Chatham, 415 F. Supp. 1214 (N.D. Ga. 1976); United States
v. Taylor, 342 F. Supp. 715 (D. Kan. 1972).
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missive counterclaim against the government? The result is to take
away much of the impact of the statutory exemption.
To Whom: Presentation to the Right Agency
The Federal Tort Claims Act requires presentation of the claim "to
the appropriate Federal agency." 3 ' In most cases, only a single federal
agency is involved and its identity is obvious to the claimant.
Occasionally, however, claimants have had difficulty discovering the
wrongdoing agency and have filed claims with a different federal
agency. The Attorney General's regulations have taken a sympathetic
approach to these claimants. The regulations specify that if a claim
is presented to the wrong agency, that agency "shall transfer it forth-
with to the appropriate agency, if the proper agency can be identified
from the claim, and advise the claimant of the transfer. If transfer
is not feasible that claim shall be returned to the claimant.".3 If the
other requirements of the administrative claim are met,'32 courts have
allowed the filing, even though with an incorrect agency, to satisfy
the claimant's administrative presentation obligations.'33 In some cases,
this has preserved the claimant's right of action just as the two-year
statute of limitations was expiring."4
A recent amendment to the Attorney General's regulations forces
the claimant to pay more attention to the "appropriate agency."'35 The
amendment added a new sentence to the regulations to require: "A
claim shall be presented as required by 28 USC 2401(b) as of the date
it is received by the appropriate agency."'36 The amendment still en-
courages the transfer of wrongly filed claims from one agency to the
other. However, it now places the burden of the statute of limita-
tions upon the claimant. The claimant's attorney who discovers that
the claim has been wrongly filed with one agency would be well ad-
vised to make a new filing with the proper agency. Reliance on the
federal bureaucracy to transfer the claim risks the chance of the claim
arriving at the appropriate agency after the statute of limitations has
run.
130. 28 U.S.C. S 2675(c).
131. 28 C.F.R. S 14.2(b)(1).
132. See, e.g., Dancy v. United States, 668 F.2d 1224 (Ct. Cl. 1982) (Merit Systems
Protection Board has no duty to pass on a document which did not mention FTCA
and was not in the form of a claim).
133. Barnson v. United States, 531 F. Supp. 614 (D. Utah 1982); Kirby v. United
States, 479 F. Supp. 863 (D.S.C. 1979); Stewart v. United States, 458 F. Supp. 871
(S.D. Ohio 1978).
134. Kirby v. United States, 479 F. Supp. 863 (D.S.C. 1979); Stewart v. United States,
458 F. Supp. 871 (S.D. Ohio 1978).
135. 28 C.F.R. S 14.2(b)(1) (1982).
136. Id. (emphasis added).
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A related issue involves the claimant who has been wronged by
more than one agency. Here, the claimant should perfect two or more
administrative claims. In Provancial v. United States,13 7 the claimant
was injured by Interior Department police. He was then negligently
treated by Public Health Service physicians. The single administrative
claim was presented to the Department of the Interior and only ad-
dressed the police abuse. A court subsequently held that the claimant
could not bring suit for medical malpractice without perfecting a com-
plaint with the Public Health Service.
When: Accrual of the Claim
The statute of limitations of the Federal Tort Claims Act requires
administrative presentation within two years "after such claim
accrues."'88 The term "accrual" is not further defined in the statute
or in the Attorney General's regulations. For most claims (notably,
automobile accident claims), the accrual date will be the date of the
accident. A more difficult problem is posed by medical malpractice
and similar claims. There the negligent or wrongful act may be
unknown to the plaintiff at the time it occurs. Further, the injuries
arising from the act may not be detected until months or years later.
Most courts that considered the accrual issue in FTCA cases allowed
the plaintiffs claims to accrue sometime after the date of the
malpractice, 1 9 but there was a split in opinion as to the exact accrual
date.
In United States v. Kubrick,0 the Supreme Court clarified the
accrual requirement. In April 1968, Kubrick was treated with neomycin
by government physicians. Shortly thereafter he suffered hearing loss.
In January 1969, another doctor informed Kubrick that the administra-
tion of the neomycin possibly had caused his hearing loss. In June
1971, a third doctor positively informed Kubrick that neomycin should
not have been administered and advised him to see a lawyer about
a possible malpractice claim. Kubrick promptly filed a proper ad-
ministrative claim under the Federal Tort Claims Act. Argument in
the case revolved around whether Kubrick's claim accrued in January
1969. Both sides recognized that the administration of neomycin,
without more, did not start the statute of limitations running. How-
ever, the government claimed that the existence of the hearing loss
137. 454 F.2d 72 (8th Cir. 1972).
138. 28 U.S.C. S 2401(b)..
139. See, e.g., Caron v. United States, 548 F.2d 366 (1st Cir. 1976); Jordan v. United
States, 503 F.2d 620 (6th Cir. 1974); Portis v. United States, 483 F.2d 670 (4th Cir.
1973); Tyminski v. United States, 481 F.2d 257 (3d Cir. 1973); Cooper y. United States,
442 F.2d 908 (7thCir. 1971); Toal v. United States, 438 F.2d 222 (2d Cir. 1971).
140. 444 U.S. 111 (1979).
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coupled with the January 1969 indication that it may have been caused
by the neomycin did constitute an accrual of Kubrick's claim. Kubrick
pointed to the June 1971 date, which he contended was when the
evidence of legal malpractice was first made clear to him.
The Supreme Court sided with the government's position. It held
that a claim accrues at the time the plaintiff "knows both the existence
and the cause of his injury."' The Court found that Congress intended
the statute of limitations to "require the reasonably diligent presen-
tation of tort claims."" A plaintiff is entitled to know of his injury
and have some information about its cause before being required to
protect his interests. Once that information is available, the respon-
sibility shifts to the plaintiff to seek medical and legal advice about
possible redress.
Appellate decisions since Kubrick generally have accepted the
government's argument that the statute of limitations has run on the
filing of the administrative claim. '43 Two cases, United States v. Waits...
and Stoleson v. United States,145 have held in the plaintiff's favor on
accrual questions. In Stoleson, the plaintiff's claim for harm from
occupational exposure to nitroglycerin was held to accrue when medical
opinion first showed a causal connection between nitroglycerin and
the plaintiff's injury. The case appears to be an appropriate reading
of the Kubrick doctrine. Waits is a more questionable reading of
Kubrick. In Waits, the plaintiffs cause of action was found not to have
accrued until the hospital released to him records which indicated
medical malpractice.
How Often: Amendment and Reconsideration of Claims
The Federal Tort Claims Act provides that one consequence of
the "sum certain" stated in the administrative claim is that it limits
the damages in a subsequent court suit.146 The suit cannot be brought
for a higher amount than the administrative claim in the absence of
newly discovered facts. The statute does not address amendment of
the sum certain in the administrative claim. The Attorney General's
regulations provide that a claim "may be amended by the claimant
141. Id. at 113.
142. Id. at 123.
143. Fernandez v. United States, 673 F.2d 269 (9th Cir. 1982); Gustavson v. United
States, 655 F.2d 1034 (10th Cir. 1981); Davis v. United States, 642 F.2d 328 (9th Cir.
1981); Garrett v. United States, 640 F.2d 24 (6th Cir. 1981); Robbins v. United States,
624 F.2d 971 (10th Cir. 1980); Ware v. United States, 626 F.2d 1278 (5th Cir. 1980);
Korgel v. United States, 619 F.2d 16 (8th Cir. 1980).
144. 611 F.2d 550 (5th Cir. 1980).
145. 629 F.2d 1265 (7th Cir. 1980).
146. 28 U.S.C. 5 2675(b).
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at any time prior to final agency action or prior to the exercise of
the claimant's option" to bring suit after six months."7 A consequence
of the amendment, however, is to give the agency an additional six
months to evaluate the administrative claim. During this period, the
claimant is forbidden to bring suit. Occasional cases have arisen in
which the government has accepted the initial claim in full. The claim-
ant's subsequent attempts to bring suit for an additional amount have
been rejected.'" Odin v. United States..9 provides the most thorough
study of the consequences of government acceptance of a claim. The
claimant filed a claim for $791 in doctor bills but emphasized to the
agency that his injuries were still being evaluated. The government
granted the claim in full. Claimant refused to accept the $791 and
enclosed an amended claim for $1,000,000. The government contended
that its acceptance of the initial claim precluded further amendment.
The court disagreed. It held that the FTCA vested the power of
acceptance in the claimant, rather than the agency. A footnote ob-
served that the facts of the Odin case did not suggest that the claim-
ant was abusing the administrative process by proposing a test set-
tlement in order to measure the government's willingness to settle. °
The Attorney General's regulations also recognize the possibility
of reconsideration of a claim denied by an administrative agency.''
A claimant who has received a final denial letter 2 "may file a writ-
ten request with the agency for reconsideration" prior to filing suit
or the expiration of the statute of limitations on bringing suit.'53 As
with the amendment of a claim, the request for reconsideration gives
the government six months from the date of the request to dispose
of the claim. It also prevents the claimant from filing suit for six
months.1"
LITIGATING PRESENTATION ISSUES: FILING SUIT UNDER THE FTCA
Nothing compels an FTCA claim to end in federal district court.
The government agency may reach a satisfactory settlement with the
claimant. The claimant may be persuaded that the reasons for the
147. 28 C.F.R. S 14.2(c).
148. Ferreira v. United States, 389 F.2d 191 (9th Cir. 1968) (reliance on pre-1966
version of 28 U.S.C. S 2675(b)); Wright v. United States, 427 F. Supp. 726 (D. Del.
1977); Wexler v. Newman, 311 F. Supp. 906 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
149. 656 F.2d 798 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
150. Id. at 806 n.30.
151. 28 C.F.R. S 14.9(b).
152. 28 U.S.C. S 2675(a).
153. 28 C.F.R. S 14.9(a).
154. Id. Litigation concerning the reconsideration provision has involved the effect
of the reconsideration request on the statute of limitations on bringing court actions.
See the discussion in notes 160-164, infra.
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government's denial of the claim are proper, and he may decide to
drop the matter. For these reasons, the considerable majority of FTCA
claims never reach the complaint stage in federal court. This validates
Congress's decision in 1966 to remove business from the federal courts
by making mandatory administrative presentation of FTCA claims.15
If the claimant chooses to go to federal court, he must be alert
to additional provisions of statute and regulation. Certain decisions
have emphasized that these provisions provide a further basis for
barring a decision on the merits of a claim which has successfully
negotiated the administrative requirements of the Act.
The Administrative Final Denial Letter
The final denial letter is the transitional stop between the ad-
ministrative and the judicial portions of the FTCA, because the denial
letter starts the second portion of the statute of limitations running
against the claimant. A tort claim is "forever barred ... unless action
is begun within six months after the date of mailing, by certified or
registered mail, of notice of final denial of the claim by the agency
to which it was presented." '
The FTCA itself requires the final denial to be in writing and
sent by certified or registered mail."5 7 The Attorney General's regula-
tions add the requirement that the final denial letter include a state-
ment that the dissatisfied claimant may file suit "not later than 6
months after the date of mailing of the notification." '58 The statute
and regulation together provide the claimant with reasonable certainty
as to when the statute of limitations is running. A government failure
to comply with the precise requirements of the final denial letter will
preserve a plaintiff's claim. 9
Difficulties with the final denial letter have arisen in cases where
the claimant seeks a reconsideration of the matter by the agency. As
noted earlier, the reconsideration entitles the government to an ad-
ditional six months to assess the claim.' However, the claimant re-
mains at risk that the government will regard the statute of limita-
tions as still running. Claremont Aircraft, Inc. v. United States... il-
lustrates the difficulties. The plaintiff's letters and conversations
155. See text at notes 29-30, supra.
156. 28 U.S.C. 2401(b).
157. 28 U.S.C. S 2401(b), 2675(a).
158. 28 C.F.R. 14.9(a).
159. Boyd v. United States, 482 F. Supp. 1126 (W.D. Pa. 1980). See also Sterner
v. United States, 462 F.2d 1177 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
160. 28 C.F.R. § 14.9(b).
161. 420 F.2d 896 (9th Cir. 1970).
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regarding reconsideration of the "finally denied" claim were received
with some encouragement by government claims officials. Never-
theless, the government did not agree to reopen the claim. By the
time the plaintiff filed suit, six months had run from the mailing of
the final denial letter. The court held that the statute of limitations
had run, and it dismissed the plaintiff's action. Woirhaye v. United
States62 reached a similar result. There the court suggested that the
running of the six-month statute of limitations could be prevented
by either a timely amended claim in accordance with the Attorney
General's regulations or by agency conduct that leads the claimant
to believe the original claim was still being considered. Nothing in
the Woirhaye facts suggested that the claimant had been told the six-
month limitation period could be avoided.
The court's suggestion does provide some guidance in the area,
but the suggestion is not clearly authorized by statute or regulation.
The claimant must remember that it will be the federal court rather
than the federal agency that will determine whether the judicial filing
requirement has been met. The claimant with a legitimate hope for
administrative reconsideration is thus placed in a difficult position.
If six months from the mailing of the final denial letter approaches,
the claimant may feel compelled to file suit in order to avoid the run-
ning of the statute of limitations."' This action, however, invites a
judicial dismissal because the agency has not had six months to act
on the reconsideration. 4 It also risks ending the agency's interest
in the claim because of its transfer to federal court. The claimant's
alternative, however, is to run the greater risk that administrative
reconsideration will prove futile and that a court will subsequently
find the statute of limitations has been exceeded.
An amendment of the statute or regulation could clarify matters.
The amendment should state that a final denial letter is controlling
unless and until the agency notifies the plaintiff in writing that it
has agreed to reconsider the claim. The reconsideration letter also
shall state that the previous final denial by the agency is revoked
and the plaintiff is precluded from filing suit for six months. This
procedure will allow the government to take a fresh look at the rare
case where an error has been made in the original denial. These cases
would be kept in the administrative process and might be settled,
since both the claimant and the government find merit in the request
for reconsideration. In the far larger class of cases where the agency
is not about to change its first denial, the plaintiff is clearly on notice
that the statute of limitations is running. Under this system, govern-
162. 609 F.2d 1303 (9th Cir. 1979).
163. 28 U.S.C. S 2401(b).
164. 28 C.F.R. S 14.9(b).
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ment agents may encourage questions about the final denial or ac-
cept offers of new factual and legal information without worrying that
they may be lulling the claimant into a false belief that the statute
of limitations is tolled or that the final denial has somehow been re-
voked. This approach also would not penalize the claimant's written
request for reconsideration by forbidding suit for six months. The
claimant who feels the agency has acted wrongly in denying the claim
should be entitled to state his position to the agency without penal-
ty. If legitimate .matters are raised, the objectives of the administrative
settlement provisions are enhanced by having the agency rather than
a court handle the matter. If the reconsideration request simply
rehashes what has already been decided, the agency is not even re-
quired to respond; hence the burden on its time seems small. At this
point, the objective of prompt claims disposition is best served by
moving the claim into court.
Meeting the Six Months Judicial Filing Requirement
A previous section examined claims that were lost for failure to
comply with the first part of the FTCA statute of limitations-
presentation of the claim to the proper administrative agency within
two years of its accrual. The failure to present any administrative
claim or a satisfactory administrative claim has caused the largest
number of dismissals under the FTCA statute of limitations. The
second part of the statute of limitations and section 2675 provide ad-
ditional hazards for the claimant who does file an administrative claim
in proper fashion.
Premature judicial filing is of first concern. The FTCA gives the
agency six months in which to assess a claim.1 An agency's final denial
within-the six months starts the running of the statute of limitations
and forces the claimant to enter federal court. However, the claimant
may not treat government indecision as a "final denial" until six
months have passed since filing. Any judicial action filed before then
will be dismissed. 6 Once the six months expire or the agency sends
a final denial, the claimant is eligible to refile the suit. A more serious
problem is the claimant who complies with the administrative presen-
tation requirement but does not meet the second part of the statute
of limitations, which bars a claim "unless action is begun within six
165. 28 U.S.C. S 2675(a); see also 28 C.F.R. SS 14.2(c) & 14.9(b).
166. Gregory v. Mitchell, 634 F.2d 199 (5th Cir. 1981); National Sea Clammers Ass'n
v. City of N.Y., 616 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1980), vacated sub nora. Middlesex County Sewage
Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1 (1981); Low v. United States, 463
F. Supp. 948 (E.D. Va. 1978); Wolfe v. Merrill Nat'l Laboratories, Inc., 433 F. Supp.
231 (M.D. Tenn. 1977); Walley v. United States, 366 F. Supp. 268 (E.D. Pa. 1973). But
see McCormick v. Cooley, 458 F. Supp. 776 (W.D. Pa. 1978).
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months after the date of mailing ... of notice of final denial."'' e Court
decisions have affirmed that this six-month requirement is in addition
to the two-year requirement for presentation of the administrative
claim. Even though suit may be filed within two years of the accrual
of the claim, it may be dismissed if the court action is not brought
within six months of the administrative final denial.' 8 Claimants also
should remember that the six-month period runs from the date of mail-
ing of the final denial rather than the date of receipt."9
A number of cases involve suits brought right at the six-month
deadline. The courts have not shown any particular sympathy to plain-
tiffs. The judicial feeling appears to be that the claimant who has
prepared the administrative claim should not need six months after
final denial to bring the claim to the federal courts. Requests by plain-
tiffs for a "slight extension" or a favorable interpretation of the statute
have not been well received.
Several factual situations have been reviewed by the courts. Most
courts that have considered the matter have adopted Rule 6 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to govern the filing date. The court
in Kollios v. United States7 ' stated the rule that the two-year and
six-month FTCA statutes of limitation shall exclude the "initial or
trigger day" and include the "last day."' 7' Dates on which government
offices are closed are excluded. In United States v. Rodriguez,'72 an
administrative final denial was mailed on December 29. The plaintiff's
suit filed on Monday, July 2, was held to meet the six-month
requirement.'73 Courts have treated the final date as the date of receipt
by the court, rather than the date the complaint was stamped "filed"'' 4
or the date process was served.'75
The cases also indicate the significance of delay in mailing. In
presenting the administrative claim, the plaintiff must remember that
merely putting the claim in the mail is not presentation to the ap-
167. 28 U.S.C. S 2401(b).
168. Childers v. United States, 442 F.2d 1299 (5th Cir. 1971); Schuler v. United
States, 628 F.2d 199 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Groce.v. Rapidair, Inc., 305 F. Supp. 1238 (W.D.N.C.
1969).
169. Carr v. Veterans Admin., 522 F.2d 1355 (5th Cir. 1975).
170. 512 F.2d 1316 (1st Cir. 1975).
171. Id. at 1317. See also Yedwab v. United States, 489 F. Supp. 717 (D.N.J. 1980);
Bledsoe v. Department of Hous. & Urban Dev., 398 F. Supp. 315 (E.D. Pa. 1975);
Rodriguez v. United States, 382 F. Supp. 1 (D.P.R. 1974).
172. 382 F. Supp. 1 (D.P.R. 1974).
173. But see Frey v. Woodard, 481 F. Supp. 1152 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (Marine Corps
office was open on the Saturday which was the expiration date).
174. Moffitt v. United States, 430 F. Supp. 34 (E.D. Tenn. 1976).
175. Hughes v. United States, 534 F. Supp. 352 (N.D. Ill. 1982).
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propriate federal agency.176 The postal service is the agent of the claim-
ant, rather than the government, when the mail miscarries. Further,
the postal service is not a federal agency to whom the claim may
be presented in expectation that it will be delivered to the proper
agency.177 Courts, however, have been willing to hear evidence on plain-
tiffs' claims that a proof of mailing would provide evidence of receipt.7 '
The government will use the mails in sending a final denial letter
to the claimant. As noted, the statute clearly states that the six-month
period for court filing begins "after the date of mailing." While no
cases have considered the matter, it is possible that a delay in postal
channels could consume a considerable portion of the six months. The
claimant is then faced with a considerably shorter period in which
to file suit. If the delay poses a serious difficulty, the attorney should
contact the agency, explain the problem, and request a second final
denial letter which withdraws the first final denial and starts a new
six-month period running. Should the agency be unwilling to do this,
the claimant would be well advised to make all necessary efforts to
comply with the statute of limitations. If this is impossible or, in the
extreme case, if the final denial letter did not reach the plaintiff until
six months after it was written, the claimant probably could persuade
a court that he was entitled to a reasonable time for filing suit.
A related issue involves the tolling of the statute of limitations.
In general, provisions of state law do not toll either portion of the
FTCA statute of limitations."' The one tolling statute that is recog-
nized under the FTCA is the Soldiers and Sailors Civil Relief Act. 8 '
Increasing the Amount Claimed
The FTCA limits the amount of damages in a judicial action to
the amount claimed administratively from the federal agency unless
"the increased amount is based upon newly discovered evidence not
reasonably discoverable at the time [of] presenting the claim ...or
176. Barlow v. AVCO Corp., 527 F. Supp. 269 (E.D. Va. 1981); Steele v. United
States, 390 F. Supp. .1109 (S.D. Cal. 1975).
177. 28 C.F.R. S 14.2(b)(1).
178. Hoffman v. United States, 398 F. Supp. 530 (E.D. Mich. 1975); Cordaro v. Lusardi,
354 F. Supp. 1147 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
179. See 1 L. JAYSON, supra note 2, S 279; Garrett v. United States, 640 F.2d 24
(6th Cir.1981) (state court action); Robbins v. United States, 624 F.2d 971 (10th Cir.
1980); Casias v. United States, 532 F.2d 1339 (10th Cir. 1976) (insanity); Mann v. United
States, 399 F.2d 672 (9th Cir. 1968) (minority and lack of education).
180. Stephan v. United States, 490 F. Supp. 323 (W.D. Mich. 1980); Lester v. United
States, 487 F. Supp. 1033 (N.D. Tex. 1980); see also Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v.
United States, 507 F.2d 508 (6th Cir. 1974).
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upon allegation and proof of intervening facts, relating to the amount
of the claim." 8 '
Courts have insisted that plaintiffs show the "newly discovered
evidence" or "intervening facts" to justify a higher damage request.
Where new evidence is lacking, courts have reduced the damages
sought to the amount stated in the administrative claim.' Other deci-
sions have suggested that a variety of factors will constitute suffi-
cient "newly discovered evidence" or "intervening facts" so as to allow
a higher damage request. Among such factors have been the develop-
ment of psychological injuries," increased life expectancy of the
claimant,"u and new state judicial decisions on damages.' Other in-
creased damages cases have stretched the language of section 2675(b)
in order to overlook obvious clerical errors'" and consider the claim-
ant's lack of education.'87
The cases allowing amendment of the damages claimed do not
reflect a very rigorous examination of whether new information did
in fact surface after the administrative process ended. The courts
resolved doubts in the claimant's favor. An imaginative lawyer deal-
ing with serious personal injury case should be able to offer plausible
explanations for an increased damage request.
GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE IMMUNITY ACTS
Some of the most questionable operations of the FTCA presenta-
tion requirements have occurred in cases involving government
employees protected by statutory immunity. Often a plaintiff is in-
jured by a government employee in a situation where government
employment is not obvious. The employee operating his own vehicle
in the scope of government employment is the most common example.
The plaintiff, often not suspecting any government connection, sues
the individual wrongdoer in state court. The United States then comes
to the protection of its employee by invoking federal statutes which
allow removal of the action from state to federal court and substitu-
tion of the United States for the individual employee defendent. At
that point, the plaintiff learns that his exclusive remedy is against
181. 28 U.S.C. S 2675(b).
182. Kielwin v. United States, 540 F.2d 676 (4th Cir. 1976); Schwartz v. United
States, 446 F.2d 1380 (3d Cir. 1971); Cuddy v. United States, 490 F. Supp. 390 (D.
Mont. 1980); DeGroot v. United States, 384 F. Supp. 1178 (N.D. Iowa 1974).
183. Letoski v. United States, 488 F. Supp. 952 (M.D. Pa. 1979).
184. Husovsky v. United States, 590 F.2d 944 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
185. Gallimore v. United States, 530 F. Supp. 136 (E.D. Pa. 1982); Funston v. United
States, 513 F. Supp. 1000 (M.D. Pa. 1981).
186. Little v. United States, 317 F. Supp. 8 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
187. McCarter v. United States, 373 F. Supp. 1152 (E.D. Tenn. 1973).
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the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act. The plaintiff
also discovers the administrative requirements of the FTCA. The
government moves to dismiss the action for failure to file a claim with
the government agency. Where more than two years have elapsed
since the accrual of the claim, the motion will be to dismiss the ac-
tion with prejudice for failure to comply with the statute of limita-
tions. The unfortunate plaintiff is stymied on all fronts. The federal
immunity statute forbids action in state or federal court against the
government employee, and the FTCA statute of limitations eliminates
the possibility of recovery against the United States.
Federal employee immunity statutes protect government vehicle
drivers ("Drivers Act"'88) and doctors and other medical personnel'89
from any personal liability for acts within the scope of their govern-
ment employment. These statutes have been held constitutional." The
opinions have observed that Congress wished to protect certain
categories of government employees from the threat of personal li-
ability for their work for the United States. In most instances, the
presence of an action against the United States under the FTCA has
left the victim with an alternative remedy. However, in cases where
the FTCA action is unavailable, the claimant is without remedy. Faced
with a choice of leaving an injured plaintiff without remedy or pro-
tecting a government driver or medical employee from suit, the court
has protected the government employee.
The cases suggest that the claimant must not wait for the govern-
ment to invoke immunity. The claimant should be attentive to signs
that the tort-feasor was a government employee and doing govern-
ment business. Where a government vehicle is involved or where the
driver is in uniform, the connection may be obvious. In other instances,
after-the-accident comments or responses to discovery requests may
disclose the government connection. In geographic areas with heavy
concentrations of government employees, the claimant should seek out
information regarding possible government connections. In some cases,
the plaintiff may provide the tort-feasor with the good news that his
defense will be handled by the United States and he is not personally
liable for damages. Once the government connection is found, the case
should be treated as an FTCA action and close attention should be
paid to the presentation requirements. Even if it is not certain that
188. 28 U.S.C. S 2679 (1976).
189. 38 U.S.C. S 4116 (1976) (Veterans Administration); 42 U.S.C. 5 233 (1976) (Public
Health Service); 10 U.S.C. § 1089 (1976 & Supp. V 1981) (Defense Department); 22 U.S.C.
S 2702 (Supp. V 1981) (State Department).
190. See, e.g., Carr v. United States, 422 F.2d 1007 (4th Cir. 1970); Montalvo v.
Graham, 390 F. Supp. 533 (E.D. Wis. 1975).
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the government employee is immune, an administrative claim should
be filed. If the individual is immune, the claimant has preserved his
action under the Federal Tort Claims Act. If it is determined that
the individual is not immune (perhaps because he is not in the scope
of government employment), the administrative complaint against the
United States can be denied or withdrawn and the litigation can pro-
ceed in state court against the individual. The hard cases are those
in which the government connection is discovered after the statute
of limitations has run. A recurrent Drivers Act case has involved an
accident situation in which nothing indicates a government employ-
ment relationship to the claimant. The case proceeds with the claim-
ant assuming that a state statute of limitations of longer than two
years applies. Then, near or beyond two years from the date of acci-
dent, the government connection is discovered. The action is removed
from state to federal court, the United States is substituted for the
government employee defendant, and the United States attorney
moves that the case be dismissed for failure to file an administrative
claim.
Despite the unfairness of the situation, the courts generally have.
denied relief to plaintiffs."' Filing suit in state court has not been
treated as an administrative claim under the FTCA,'92 nor is the ad-
ministrative claims requirement satisfied by insurance company 9 ' or
attorney"' letters to the government employee. Also, the claim does
not "accrue" at the time government employment is determined.9
191. Wilkinson v. United States, 677 F.2d 998 (4th Cir. 1982); Stewart v. United
States, 655 F.2d 741 (7th Cir. 1981); Wollman v. Gross, 637 F.2d 544 (8th Cir. 1980),
reh'g en banc denied, 646 F.2d 1306 (8th Cir. 1981); Melo v. United States, 505 F.2d
1026 (8th Cir. 1974); Meeker v. United States, 435 F.2d 1219 (8th Cir. 1970); Carr v.
United States, 422 F.2d 1007 (4th Cir. 1970); Gonzales v. United States Postal Serv.,
543 F. Supp. 838 (N.D. Cal. 1982); Benitez v. Presbiterian Hosp., 539 F. Supp. 470 (D.P.R.
1982); Wilkinson v. Gray, 523 F. Supp. 372 (E.D. Va. 1981); Flickinger v. United States,
523 F. Supp. 1372 (W.D. Pa. 1981); Dunaville v. Carnago, 485 F. Supp. 545 (S.D. Ohio
1980); McGowan v. Williams, 481 F. Supp. 681 (N.D. Ill. 1979); Lien v. Beehner, 453
F. Supp. 604 (N.D.N.Y. 1978); Fuller v. Daniel, 438 F. Supp. 928 (N.D. Ala. 1977); Reilly
v. Peterson, 435 F. Supp. 862 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Miller v. United States, 418 F. Supp.
373 (D. Minn. 1976); Montalvo v. Graham, 390 F. Supp. 533 (E.D. Wis. 1975); Binn v.
United States, 389 F. Supp. 988 (E.D. Wis. 1975); Baker v. United States, 341 F. Supp.
494 (D. Md. 1972); Skrocki v. Butler, 324 F. Supp. 1042 (E.D. Mich. 1971); Kizer v.
Sherwood, 311 F. Supp. 809 (M.D. Pa. 1970); Driggers v. United States, 309 F. Supp.
1377 (D.S.C. 1970).
192. Melo v. United States, 505 F.2d 1026 (8th Cir. 1974); Meeker v. United States,
435 F.2d 1219 (8th Cir. 1970); Flickinger v. United States, 523 F. Supp. 1372 (W.D.
Pa. 1981); Miller v. United States, 418 F. Supp. 373 (D. Minn. 1976).
193. Driggers v. United States, 309 F. Supp. 1377 (D.S.C. 1970).
194. Binn v. United States, 389 F. Supp. 988 (E.D. Wis. 1975).
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Three courts of appeals decisions provide some hope for claimants.
In Henderson v. United States,'" the Tenth Circuit treated the state
court filing as tolling the statute of limitations. In United States v.
LePatourel,97 the court allowed a claim to accrue at the date that
an unsettled question of law regarding government employment was
determined. The most notable proplaintiff decision is Kelley v. United
States.9 ' There the court interpreted the Drivers Act as not requir-
ing an administrative presentation of a claim. The case recognizes the
unfairness of many of the Drivers Act cases. Kelley and other cases
have suggested in dicta that a claim may be preserved where it can
be shown that the government has lulled the claimant into a false
sense of security.' The exact contours of the "false sense of security"
exception have not been spelled out. Certainly, a strong case would
be present where the government knew that a state court action could
be removed under an immunity statute and consciously delayed
removal or notification to the plaintiff until after the running of the
FTCA statute of limitations.
The dismissal with prejudice of actions arising out of the
negligence of immunized government employees is the most unjust
aspect of the operation of the FTCA administrative procedures. The
presence of over twenty such cases suggests the significance of the
problem.2"' A number of these cases suggest that the claimant was
unaware of the government connection until after the running of the
statute of limitations.2 1
A recent study of government employee immunity cases has con-
cluded that the legislative history of the Drivers Act is unclear about
the necessity of administrative exhaustion.0 2 Congress should take
196. 429 F.2d 588 (10th Cir. 1970). See also Whistler v. United States, 252 F. Supp.
913 (N.D. Ind. 1966).
197. 593 F.2d 827 (8th Cir. 1979). The case determined that a federal judge was
to be treated as a federal employee for purposes of the FTCA and the Drivers Act,
28 U.S.C. 5 2679.
198. 568 F.2d 259 (2d Cir. 1978). See also Van Lieu v. United States, 542 F. Supp.
862 (N.D.N.Y. 1982); Harris v. Burris Chem., Inc., 490 F. Supp. 968 (N.D. Ga. 1980).
199. Wilkinson v. United States, 677 F.2d 998 (4th Cir. 1982); Wollman v. Gross,
637 F.2d 544 (8th Cir. 1980), reh'g en banc denied, 646 F.2d 1306 (8th Cir. 1981); Kelley
v. United States, 568 F.2d 259 (2d Cir. 1978); Wilkinson v. Gray, 523 F. Supp. 372
(E.D. Va. 1981).
200. See note 191, supra.
201. E.g., Wollman v. Gross, 637 F.2d 544 (8th Cir. 1980), reh'g en banc denied 646
F.2d 1306 (8th Cir. 1981); Flickinger v. United States, 523 F. Supp. 1372 (W.D. Pa.
1981); Dunaville v. Carnago, 485 F. Supp. 545 (S.D. Ohio 1980); Fuller v. Daniel, 438
F. Supp. 928 (N.D. Ala. 1977); Baker v. United States, 341 F. Supp. 494 (D. Md. 1972).
202. Comment, Administrative Claims and the Substitution of the United States as
Defendant under the Federal Drivers Act: The Catch 22 of the Federal Tort Claims Act?,
29 EMORY L.J. 755, 786-87 (1980).
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action either to correct the judicial decisions requiring presentation
or to emphasize that exhaustion is essential to the government
employee immunity statutes. Any proposed amendment (or judicial
interpretation of present statutes) should address four objectives: (1)
giving an absolute immunity to the favored government employee,
(2) requiring claims under the FTCA to be submitted through the ad-
ministrative claims process, (3) requiring the prompt examination of
claims against the government, and (4) doing justice to parties harmed
by government wrongdoing. The present approach does not satisfy
the fourth objective. Suggestions to protect the claimant can under-
cut each of the first three objectives. A blanket exclusion of immunity
statute claims from FTCA administrative presentation could under-
cut administrative settlements. At worst, it would provide a claimant
with an option to avoid administrative processing by beginning suit
in state court against the government employee. This would add to
the harrassment of the government employee. Even where the bypass
was not a knowing one on the claimant's part, the government would
lose the opportunity to expedite claims settlement and reduce the
burden on the federal courts through the administrative process. An
alternative amendment could require administrative presentation but
toll the statute of limitations until the claim first reaches either state
or federal court or the federal government first asserts the employee's
immunity. This would prevent the loss of a valid claim by an
unsuspecting claimant. It would also preserve the use of the FTCA
administrative process and protect the immunity of the government
employee. However, it risks a considerable delay in the presentation
of claims against the United States. A claimant, for example, might
not file suit against the government employee in state court until the
end of a three-year state statute of limitations. It may be several more
months before the United States' interest is asserted and the case
is removed to federal court. Only then would the statute of limita-
tions begin to run against the claimant. Even if the claimant were
given only six months (rather than two years) to present a proper
FTCA administrative claim, the government still might be forced to
investigate four year old facts. The most satisfactory solution to the
immunized government employee problem would rely on the Kubrick"3
standard used to determine the accrual of claims. The statute of limita-
tions for filing an administrative claim should begin to run when the
claimant first knows or should know that he was injured by a federal
employee. At the latest, this would be the date that the United States
seeks removal of the state court action against the individual govern-
ment employee. More likely, it would be a date much closer to the
accident. The claimant may discover the government connection on
203. United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111 (1979). See text at notes 140-42, supra.
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the date of the accident. The claimant who is struck by a govern-
ment sedan or is negligently treated in a government hospital should
be on notice as to the existence of United States liability. Claimant
knowledge might be found if a letter from the government or an in-
surance company investigation reveals the possibility that the injury
was caused by a government employee acting in the scope of his
employment. At such time, the claimant has the factual knowledge
on which to investigate a claim against the United States. The Kubrick
test requires no more." 4 This test also encourages the government
to notify potential claimants of their exclusive right to sue the United
States. If a government employee has been involved in circumstances
indicating both his negligence and the existence of a statutory im-
munity, the agency involved may inform the claimant that his exclusive
action is under the FTCA with its administrative claims requirement.
Such an approach has value for all parties concerned. It frees the
government employee of the burdens of a lawsuit-an objective of
the immunity statutes. It provides the injured claimant with clear
directions as to how to pursue a claim for redress-an objective of
the FTCA. It allows the government to start the running of the statute
of limitations and provides proof of its commencement-an objective
of the FTCA statute of limitations.
CONCLUSION
The number of failed claims resulting from the FTCA presenta-
tion requirements is depressing. Much time and money has been
wasted. Many meritorious claims have never received a hearing, no
doubt leaving their proponents to wonder how sincere is Congress's
pledge to recompense victims of negligent or wrongful acts of govern-
ment employees. While the mandatory administrative procedures of
the FTCA have removed some work from the federal courts, added
court time has been spent interpreting the meaning of the ad-
ministrative procedures.
How can matters be improved? Quite possibly abolition of the ad-
ministrative presentation requirement would prevent many presenta-
tion errors. However, the benefits of administrative settlement are
considerable and should not be undercut by removing the require-
ment that the claimant first seek administrative relief. While major
revision is not appropriate, Congress could amend the FTCA and
related statutes to clarify the presentation requirements and remove
some of the unneeded traps for claimants. Alternatively, the Attorney
General's regulations could be amended to reflect the desired approach.
Finally, the federal courts could interpret the existing law to achieve
204. Id. at 123.
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the same result. To recapitulate suggestions made in this article: The
"sum certain" requirement and the requirement of thorough documen-
tation of claims should not be used to classify claims as not having
met the presentation requirement. The "sum certain" is often the pro-
duct of an exaggerated guess early in the negotiating process.
Documentation requests may suggest that the government is seeking
an added advantage in the negotiating process. Certainly, the govern-
ment agency should be free to ask for information, including at some
point, a specification of damages. If the agency feels the claimant is
uncooperative, it can either ignore the claimant or issue a final denial
letter. The administrative reconsideration procedure should be cor-
rected as suggested earlier." 5 The proposed correction would provide
certainty for claimants and speed overall handling of claims for the
government. The individual immunity statutes should be amended to
end the unfairness of disqualifying claimants who never knew they
had been wronged by a federal employee until the statute of limita-
tions had run. These proposals can correct the few serious deficien-
cies in the administrative presentation statutes and regulations. The
greater problem of attorney and claimant ignorance of the presenta-
tion requirements will remain. This article may be some aid in solving
that problem.
205. See text at notes 160-164, supra.
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